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Abstract
Direct and indirect investment by Sovereign Wealth Funds in the financial services sector glob-
ally has increased exponentially since the credit crunch began last July. The investment has been
accompanied by increasingly shrill rhetoric within recipient countries. This concern encompasses the
governance and operational management structures adopted by diverse funds and the impact on
individual corporations. More problematically, it also centers on alleged wider geo-political and
economic systemic risk. The paper delineates the parameters of the debate. It evaluates the extent
to which it reflects genuine pressing concerns or attempts to rewrite the rules governing financial
liberalization owing to an incremental hut perceptible and perhaps irrevocable transfer of economic
and political power.
I. Introduction
The ongoing crisis in global commercial debt markets has exposed glaring deficiencies
in operational and strategic risk management systems.' Effective and efficient capital mar-
kets depend on confidence in the integrity of financial institutions, the regulatory appara-
tus, and, ultimately, trust between market participants and financial intermediaries. Self-
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1. For global overviews, see SENIOR SUPERVISORS GROUP, OBSERVATIONS ON RISK MANAGFMENT"
PRACTICES DURING THE RECENT MARKET TURBULENCE (2008); FINANCIAL STABILITY FORUM, REPORT
OF TrHE FINANCIAL STABILITY FORUM ON ENHANCING MARKET AND INSTrruTIONAL RESILIENCE (2008);
John Lipsky, First Deputy Managing Dir., IMF, Speech at the Peterson Institute: Dealing with the Financial
Turmoil: Contingent Risks, Policy Challenges, and the Role of the IMF (Mar. 12, 2008), http://www.imf.
org/externallnp/speeches/2008/031208.html; PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS,
POLICY STATEMENT" ON FINANCIAL MARKEar DEVELOPMENTFS (2008).
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evidently, trust like liquidity and solvency is now in very short supply, and confidence has
evaporated. The collapse of Northern Rock in the United Kingdom, Bear Stearns in the
United States, and dubious, if not criminal, underwriting practices in both jurisdictions
exacerbate a wider systemic problem. 2 The decision by Washington to mount a rescue of
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, two government-sponsored but ostensibly independent
mortgage companies, leaves the U.S. taxpayer potentially liable for billions of dollars in
losses and extends the reach of the crisis dramatically. While dispute continues on what
should be done, there is fundamental agreement on the severity of the crisis and its impli-
cations for regulatory design.3 For example, the former Deputy Governor of the Bank of
England, Rachel Lomax, has referred to the unfolding multi-dimensional nature of the
"largest ever peacetime liquidity crisis." 4 Alan Greenspan, the former Chairman of the
Federal Reserve, agrees. He suggests the debacle "is likely to be judged in retrospect as
the most wrenching since the end of the Second World War.... Those of us who look at
the self-interest of lending institutions to protect shareholder equity have to be in a state
of shocked disbelief."5
This assessment mirrors that of Timothy Geithner, the President of the Federal Re-
serve of New York:
[u]ncertainty about the future, and the greater complexity of leveraged structured
products, created a dense fog around estimates of potential loss, making institutions
and markets more vulnerable to an adverse surprise when conditions changed, and
making it harder to manage the many principal agent problems inherent in the finan-
cial business. In effect, some major banks and investments banks made the choice to
follow the market down as underwriting practices eroded. 6
2. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, More Than 400 Defendants Charged for Roles in Mortgage Fraud
Schemes as Part of Operation "Malicious Mortgage" (June 19, 2008). For the United Kingdom, see Jennifer
Hughes, Mortgage Fraud Crackdown on Brokers, FIN. TIMES (London), July 19, 2008, at 1. For background on
lending practices, see Giovanni Dell'Ariccia, Deniz Igan & Luc Laeven, Credit Booms and Lending Standards:
Evidence from the Subprime Mortgage Market (International Monetary Fund, Working Paper 08/106, 2008);
CIIARLES R. MORRIS, THE TRILLION DOLLAR MELIOOWN: EASY MoNEY, HIGH ROLLERS, AND THE
GREAT CREDIT CRASH (U.S. Public Affairs 2008).
3. For information relating to the United States, see Timothy Geithner, President & CEO, Fed. Reserve
Bank of New York, Speech at the Council on Foreign Relations Corp. Conference: The Current Financial
Challenges: Policy and Regulatory Implications (Mar. 6, 2008) [hereinafter Geithner Speech]; Ben S.
Bernanke, Chairman, U.S. Fed. Reserve, Speech at the Fed. Reserve Bank of Chicago Annual Conference:
Risk Management in Financial Institutions (May 15, 2008). For information relating to Europe, see Charlie
McCreevy, European Comm'r, Internal Market & Serv., Speech at the Workshops of the Alliance of Liberals
and Democrats for Europe (Feb. 27, 2008) [hereinafter McCreevy Speech]. For information on the United
Kingdom, see Rachel Lomax, Deputy Governor, Bank of England, Speech to the Institute of Econ. Affairs
25th Anniversary Conference: The State of the Economy (Feb. 26, 2008).
4. Lomax, supra note 3, at 5.
5. Alan Greenspan, We Will Never Have a Perfect Model of Risk, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 17, 2008, at 9.
What is also clear, however, is that voluntary systems of oversight are grossly insufficient. The Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), which emerged as key regulator of investment banks through the Consolidated
Supervised Entities Program, devised in 2004 in part to avoid regulation of U.S.-based investment banks by
the European Union, has abolished the initiative. In a statement, SEC Chairman Christopher Cox admitted,
"the past six months have demonstrated that voluntary regulation does not work." Press Release, U.S. Sec. &
Exch. Comm'n, Chairman Cox Announces End of Consolidated Supervised Entities Program (Sept. 26,
2008).
6. Geithner Speech, supra note 3.
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The search for yield has been replaced by an urgent need for recapitalization. Central
banks in the United States, Canada, and Europe have enhanced the type of collateral
accepted in return for short-term financing. In the case of the U.S. Federal Reserve, the
range of institutional actors able to avail of its discount-lending window has been
stretched to-and arguably surpasses-formal legal power.7 Many leading banks have se-
cured additional financing through rights issues. Continued share price declines have
made each form of financing exceptionally problematic. Institutional investors are nurs-
ing major losses, thereby dulling enthusiasm for further issuance. 8 The limits of central
bank capacity and the reticence of traditional institutional shareholders have necessitated
the search for new sources of funding.
The most promising, although controversial, new source is funding from Sovereign
Wealth Funds (SWFs). These state-backed asset management pools have become pivotal
actors in the provision of the liquidity to minimize the solvency dilemma posed by de-
clared cumulative losses of more than $320 billion (U.S) across the global banking sector.9
SWFs invested $24.8 billion (U.S.) in the first two months of 2008, just under half the
total amount dispersed in 2007.10 Since January 2007, $60.7 billion (U.S.) of the total of
$72.9 billion (U.S.) invested in SWFs has been invested in the financial sector." Despite
media coverage on China and the Gulf, it has been the city-state of Singapore that has
been the most aggressive, with portfolio enhancements of $41.7 billion (U.S.).12 It is,
perhaps, indicative of the scale of the crisis that Barney Frank, the Democratic Chairman
of the U.S. House of Representatives Financial Services Committee, plaintively admitted:
"[w]e need the money... [w]e'd be worse off without it." t3 A similar view pertains in
Brussels. The European Commissioner for Internal Markets has wryly noted the "irony
in the fact that the entities that were being demonized at that time [by vested interests in
Europe] . . .have in recent months been the saviours rather than the demons."14
At the same time, the reliance on SWFs raises much wider geo-political issues. Contes-
tation centers on the perceived transparency and accountability deficit associated with
their governance, particularly those from China and Russia. It is far from clear, however,
whether the risks identified-financial contagion, the exercise of soft power, the need to
protect legitimate national interests, and governance deficiencies-represent pressing dan-
7. The most stringent criticism in this regard has come from a former chairman of the Federal Reserve
itself. He argued that the erosion of trust and replacement of relational with transactional imperatives created
a crisis of such magnitude that "the Federal Reserve judged it necessary to take actions that extend to the very
edge of its lawful and implied powers, transcending certain long embedded central banking principles and
practices." Paul A. Volcker, Former Chairman, U.S. Fed. Reserve, Address at the 395th meeting of Eco-
nomic Club of New York (Apr. 8, 2008).
8. See, e.g., Richard Wachman, HBOS £ 4 bn Rights Issue is a Massive Flop: Mortgage Provider Prepares to
Reveal the UK's Highest-Profile Funding Failure in 20 Years, OBSERVER (London), July 20, 2008, at BI; Peter
Thai Larsen, Chris Hughes & Dave Shellock, Banks' Cash Calls Shunned, FIN. TIMES (London), July 19, 2008,
at 1.




13. David Enrich, Robin Sidel & Susanne Craig, World Rides to Wall Street's Rescue, WALL ST. J., Jan. 16,
2008, at Al.
14. Charlie McCreevy, European Comm'r, Internal Market & Serv., Speech at the Annual Dinner for the
Society of Business Economists: Credit Crisis & the Aftermath (Feb. 6, 2008).
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gers or thinly veiled protectionism. Moreover, the clumsy shoehorning of explicit pohti-
cal desiderata into economic policy within recipient countries cuts against the open
investment policy that informs the stated aims of financial globalization.' 5 This confla-
tion, in turn, poses profound legitimacy and authority risks for international organiza-
tions, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) that are attempting to broker a com-
promise between competing trade and political imperatives.
Tentative agreement has been reached on a draft set of Generally Accepted Principles
and Practices for SWFs-the Santiago Principles. 16 There remain, however, significant
problems on how these principles can be implemented and enforced. Consequently, the
remainder of the paper is structured as follows. First, it identifies how and why SWFs
have been able to exploit deficiencies in the governance of major institutional actors
within investment banking and their regulation. Second, it identifies the potential risks
associated with the injection of liquidity from sources not governed by western market
mores. Third, it evaluates the efficacy of current regulatory approaches, with particular
reference to foreign investment review processes. Finally, the paper concludes with an
assessment of the cogency of this framework and the impact of the debate on capital flows
and financial globalization more generally.
IT. The Price of Failure
The combination of a commercial failure to exercise restraint and defective external
oversight within the global investment banking community has offered an extraordinary
commercial opportunity (and risk) to state-sponsored investment funds. Paradoxically,
their capacity to take such large contrarian positions is linked to a deficit in direct and
ongoing accountability. The lack of direct market oversight shields some of the larger
funds from short-term pressures. It also exacerbates perceptions that the funds may be
used to further political objectives-perceptions, that, it must be pointed out at the outset,
have no empirical basis. Nevertheless, the rising power of the asset class has sparked an
acrimonious debate on whether the "New Mercantilism" threatens legitimate national in-
terests, or, more alarmingly, the capacity to maintain social cohesion in recipient coun-
tries. 17 Thus, while greater transparency and accountability of SWFs investment activity
may limit the extent of formal political control over investment decisions, it is unlikely to
address the geopolitical realities of what the Vice Chancellor of the Delaware Court of
15. ORAGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD) INVESTMENT COM-
MITTEE REPORT, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS AND RECIPIENT COUNTRY POLICIES (Apr. 4, 2008) [herein-
after INVESTMENT COaussIIT"EE REPORT].
16. It is indicative of the sensitivities involved that the principles themselves were not published when
announced in September 2008. According to Mr. Al Suwaid, "there was a very frank exchange .... A lot of
the discussion focused on the need to preserve the economic and financial interests of the sovereign wealth
funds so as not to put them at a disadvantage when compared to the other types of investors such as hedge
funds, insurance companies, and other institutional investors." Press Conference Call, Int'l Working Group
of Sovereign Wealth Funds, Comments on Release of Santiago Principles (Sept. 22, 2008), available at http:f/
www.iwg-swf.org/tr/swftr08Ol.htn [hereinafter IWG Press Conference Call].
17. See Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Sovereign Wealth Funds and Corporate Governance: A Mini-
malirt Response to the New Mercbantilism (Sanford Univ. Law & Econ. Olin Working Paper Series, Paper
No.355 & Columbia Univ. Law & Econ.Working Paper Series, Paper No. 328, 2008), available at http.//ssm.
com/abstract= 1095023.
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Chancery has, somewhat controversially, termed the rise of societies that "sink[] even
deeper beneath the normative floor the West sets for the ethically and socially responsible
conduct of corporate affairs."' The policy challenge neutralizes this debate, ensuring that
the normative benefits of greater transparency and accountability extend beyond the
SWFs sector and are integrated with concomitant improvements in inward investment
processes. To do otherwise preordains conflict at a time in which western leverage is
severely compromised.
SWFs have been in existence without contestation for a number of years. The source of
seed capital can derive from one-off windfalls, such as the proceeds from privatization. 19
Recurring foreign exchange receipts from natural resource exploitation provide a second
revenue stream.20 A third derives from the investment of profits accruing from adroit
entrepot trading.21 They form an increasingly important component of overarching
macro-economic strategies to take advantage of a spike in commodity prices.2 2 In part,
the hoarding of cash reserves in foreign currency can be traced to a determination in
emerging economies to reduce vulnerability to sudden capital outflows or commodity
price declines. Individual funds, if mandated to invest overseas, can also lower domestic
demand or inflationary pressures by diverting excess liquidity. 23 Unlike traditional stabili-
zation funds, which tend to invest in easily convertible treasury bonds to ensure immediate
access in the event of a sudden deterioration in critical export markets, the larger SWFs
tend to adopt longer-term investment horizons. Moreover, there is an increasing propen-
sity to diversify into a much broader range of equities and alternative asset classes, such as
private equity, real estate, the U.S. film industry, and British soccer. At the same time, it
is impossible to characterize SWFs as a homogenous group and, arguably, conceptually
incoherent to devise an overarching regulatory approach to deal with such diverse pools of
capital.
Governmental asset holdings have now eclipsed hedge funds and private equity in funds
under management. It is estimated that the total investment pool (without leverage) could
reach as much as $10 trillion by 2012.24 The European Commission has recognized
SWFs now form an essential transmission belt within the engine of financial globaliza-
18. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Common Sense and Common Ground? Reflections on the Shared Interests of Man-
agers and Labor in a More Rational System of Corporate Governance, 33 IOWA J. CORP. L. 1, 17 (2007).
19. The Australian Future Fund, established in 2006, received seed capital from the proceeds of the federal
government's stake in Telstra, which was privatized the previous year.
20. Examples here include the Norwegian Government Pension Fund-Global and the Abu Dhabi Invest-
ment Authority.
21. The two Singaporean Sovereign Wealth Funds-the Government of Singapore Investment Corporation
and Temasek Holdings-are paradigmatic examples.
22. Brazil, for example, has announced plans to set up its own Sovereign Wealth Fund, which will have an
initial capitalization of $10 billion. See Matt Moffett, Brazil joins Front Rank of New Economic Powers, WALL
ST. J., May 13, 2008, at Al.
23. Australia's new government, for example, has diverted part of $22 billion (AUS) surplus arising (in part)
from mineral exports into three separate infrastructure funds. It is unclear whether these funds will be time-
limited and the likely effect, if any, of liquidation timed to synchronize with the political calendar. See Inter-
view with Wayne Swan, Treasurer, Commonwealth of Australia, ABC Radio Nat'l Breakfast (May 14, 2008);
Wayne Swan, Treasurer, Commonwealth of Australia, Speech at the Nat'l Press Club Canberra (May 14,
2008).
24. Simon Johnson, The Rise of Sovereign Wealth Funds, FIN. & DEv., Sept. 2007, at 56, available at http:/
www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/fandd/2007/09/straight.hun.
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tion.25 Informal polling at the 2008 World Economic Forum in Davos characterized
SWFs as both global powers and global power brokers.26 The visibility has ensured that,
like private equity and hedge funds before, the sector has attracted the attention of policy-
makers. Critically, this concern was evident even before the implosion of the securitiza-
tion market demonstrated serious flaws in the overarching regulatory systems of control.
The experience of large corporations in the industrialized world demonstrates that
potential for error and abuse exists even in apparently highly rated and well-managed
organizations. From a systemic perspective, transparency will facilitate the mainte-
nance of openness to investment. What may have been tenable in a world where
Sovereign Wealth Funds manage only several hundred billion dollars may not be
tenable in a world where Sovereign Wealth Funds manage several trillion dollars.
27
Policymakers in both London and Brussels remark candidly, if privately, that the core
dilemma is how to engage a resurgent Beijing. The chair of the influential Treasury Select
Committee, John McFaul, argues that "there is a paranoia, particularly in Washington,
about China. '2s One of the most senior European regulators remarked to this researcher
it was important "to be brutally frank. This is not about Singapore or Norway or even the
Gulf Sovereign Wealth Funds; this is about how to deal with the power of China." 29 The
rhetoric is much more pronounced in US discourse, in part because of the exigencies of
the electoral calendar. Echoes can be found, however, across the Atlantic. Influential
countries within the European Union-such as Germany and France-still remain deeply
skeptical about the benefits of financial capitalism, irrespective of the source.3° The more
muscular foreign policy adopted by Russia serves to heighten skittishness precisely be-
cause of the difficulty in differentiating business and government interests. The suspi-
25. COaaanSSION OF THE EUROPEAN CoMMUNmIES, A Common European Approach to Sovereign Wealth
Funds, delivered to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the
Committee of the Regions (2008) [hereinafter COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COauNrriEs]; see also IN-
VESTMENT COMMITFEE REPORT, supra note 15, at 2.
26. Michael Useem, Lessons from Davos, One of Globalization's Best Classrooms, KNOWLEDGE@WCHARTON,
Feb. 6, 2008, at 2, http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfinarticleid=1893.
27. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Remarks by Acting Under Secretary for International Affairs
Clay Lowery on Sovereign ,V~ealth Funds and the International Financial System (June 21, 2007) [hereinafter
Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Treasury].
28. Interview with John McFaul, in Glasgow (Apr. 7, 2008). For a discussion of anti-Chinese sentiment in
Congress and its impact on policy, see Stanley Lubman, The Dragon as Demon: Images of China on Capitol Hill
(Center for the Study of Law and Society Jurisprudence and Social Policy Program, Vorking Paper No. 18,
2004). This is not to downplay concern in Europe about a resurgent Russia. See, ROBERT KAGAN, THE
RETURN OF HISTORY AND THE END OF DREAMS (Knopf 2008); EDWARD LUCAS, THE NEW COLD WAR:
THE FutrURE UOF RUssIA AND THE THREAT TO THE WFST (Palgrave Macmillan 2008). For media coverage
of the dispute over BP's Russian subsidiary, see Clifford J. Levy & Sophia Kishkovsky, Fight over TNK-BP
Revives Worries About Kremlin, IN,'L HERALD TRIB., June 17, 2008, at 18; Robin Pagnamenta, 'Harassed'
TNK-BP Chief Quits Russia, WEEKEND AUSTL., July 26, 2008, at 39.
29. Interview with Charlie McCreevy, European Comm'r, Internal Market & Serv., in Brussels, Belgium
(Apr. 15, 2008).
30. The acrimonious debates on the alleged deleterious implications of private equity last year testify to the
strength of this ideational tension. See Justin O'Brien, Charting an Icarian Flightpatb: The Implications of the
Qantas Deal Collapse, in PRIVATE EQUITY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE DYNAMICS OF CAPITAL
A-RKr REGULATION 295 (Justin O'Brien, ed., Imperial College Press 2007) [hereinafter Charting an Icarian
Fligbtpatb]; John W. Cioffi, Corporate Governance Reform, Regulatory Politics, and the Foundations of Finance
Capitalism in the United States and Germany, 7 GERMAN LJ. 533 (2006).
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cions that Russia is prepared to deploy its energy reserves strategically in order to advance
political objectives, for example, are reinforced by the revolving door between Gazprom
and the Kremlin.31 The interlinked governance and investment principles proposed to
alleviate the risk of political imperatives trumping economic ones in the context of an
invigorated state capitalism will be explored more fully below. First, however, it is neces-
sary to evaluate the precise nature of the problems allegedly posed by SWFs.
HI. The Repricing of Risk
The risks associated with SWFs can be usefully broken into three core areas: the risk of
financial contagion; the exercise of soft political power; and national security considera-
tions. Each will be briefly outlined and the cogency of the regulatory approaches sug-
gested by the United States, Europe, and Australia evaluated. The final substantive
section suggests that continued reliance on current conceptions of what effective corpo-
rate governance entails-based on the transformative potential of transparency and ac-
countability-is itself fundamentally flawed.
A. THE RISK OF FINANCIAL CONTAGION
Significant investment banks have secured immediate survival by turning to SWFs op-
erating out of the Middle East, East, and South East Asia (see table one). The U.S. Fed-
eral Reserve and the European Union along with the OECD emphasize the stabilizing
role of SWFs in ameliorating the current crisis. 32 The size, scale, and degree to which
investment strategies used by SVVFs are disclosed differ dramatically, however. Variable
opacity makes it difficult to gauge whether inappropriate or misguided investment expan-
sion could potentially generate economic distortions. An apparent increase in risk toler-
ance, for example, may not be politically sustainable. Sharp commodity price fluctuation,
large losses arising from misguided investment decisions, or further deteriorations in eq-
uity markets could test the faith of new market entrants. The publication of exact mea-
sures used to set performance is central to the argument that sudden capital outflows must
be managed to prevent or at the least ameliorate wider contagion. 33 There is no evidence,
however, that this risk is anything more than hypothetical.
Investment bankers in London and New York speak positively of their experience with
executives from the major funds. One research director for a major investment bank sug-
gested that the funds have become a magnet for rising stars within the asset management
31. Andrew E. Kramer, As Gazprom's Chairman Moves Up, So Does Russia's Most Powerful Company, INT'L
HERALD TRIB. (Online), May 11, 2008, http://www.iht.com/artices/2008/05/1 I/business/1 lgaz.php; Anders
Aslund, Senior Fellow, Peterson Inst. for Int'l Econ., Speech Before the European People's Party, European
Parliament, Russia Energy and the European Union: Perspectives on Gazprom (May 15, 2008); Andreas
Goldthau, Resuirgent Russia? Rethinking Energy Inc., Policy Rev., Feb.-Mar. 2008, available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract= 137616.
32. Scott G. Alvarez, Gen. Counsel, SWFs, Testimony before the Fin. Serv. Comm., U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives (Mar. 5, 2008); CONLMISSION OF -ME EUROPEAN Co, %U',TrIs, supra note 25; see also IMF Mon-
etary & Capital Markets & Policy Development & Review Departments, Sovereign Wealth Funds-A Work
Agenda 13 (Feb. 29, 2008) [hereinafter IMF, Work Agenda].
33. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Treasury, supra note 27.
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INVESTMENT SUB-PRIME EQUITY
BANK LOSSES SWF INJECTION (US $ BILLIONS) STAKE
Merrill Lynch 31.7 11 including 9.4
4.4 (Temasek, Singapore) 3.0
2.0 (Korea Investment Fund) 3.0
2.0 (Kuwaiti Investment Fund)
0.3 (New Jersey Division of Investment)
Citigroup 40 20.0 including: 4.9
7.5 (Abu Dhabi Investment Authority) 3.7
6.8 (Singapore Investment Corporation) 1.6
3.0 (Kuwait Investment Authority)
0.4 (New Jersey Division of Investment)
UBS 38 9.7 (Singapore Investment Corporation) 9.8
Morgan Stanley 12.6 5 (China Investment Corporation) 9.9
Table 1: Sovereign Wealth Fund Investments
firmament.34 Moreover, the larger funds emphasize the quality of external advice and
internal controls. The leading Singaporean fund, Temasek Holdings, recently sent its ex-
ecutive director-Simon Israel-to a congressional hearing to impress upon U.S. lawmakers
how the fund is insulated from political influence. Simon Israel noted that Temasek has
an eight-member majority-independent board structure that is supplemented by an inter-
national advisory panel that includes William McDonough (Vice Chairman of Merrill
Lynch) and David Bonderman (founding partner of Texas Pacific Group).35 Similarly, the
ranking civil servant responsible for the oversight of the Norwegian Government Pension
Fund-Global, Europe's largest SWF, emphasized to Congress its own well-developed
controls and the need for regulatory restraint.3 6
Not surprisingly, the governance structure adopted by the Norwegians is often
presented as paradigmatic of best practice. 37 It invests across an investment universe with
risk tolerance levels set and monitored by the Ministry of Finance. 38 The portfolio is
diversified across geographic and sectoral dimensions. 39 As Thomas Ekeli, a senior official
in the Department of Finance in Oslo has pointed out, "this balance ensures the fund can
34. Interview with Research Dir., Investment Bank, in London, (July 19, 2008).
35. Simon Claude Israel, Executive Dir. & Board Member, Temasek Holdings (Private) Ltd., Testimony
before Fin. Serv. Comm., U.S. House of Representatives (Mar. 5, 2008).
36. Martin Skancke, Dir. Gen., Asset Mgmt. Dep't, Norwegian Ministry of Finance, Statement to Fin.
Serv. Comm., U.S. House of Representatives (Mar. 5, 2008). The fund details all of its investments and
conforms to an ethical code of practice. For the precise governance rules of the Norwegian Government
Pension Fund-Global, see Norges Bank, Ethical Guidelines for the Government Pension Fund-Global,
http://www.norges-bank.no/Pages/Article-68360.aspx (last visited Jan. 23, 2009).
37. See generally Simon Chesterman, The Turn to Ethics: Disinvestment fi-on Multinational Corporations for
Hunian Rights Violations-The Case of Norway's Sovereign Wealth Fund (N.Y.U. Sch. of Law Public Law & Legal
Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 08-25, 2008), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=
1082685.
38. NORWVFGIAN MINISTRY OF FIN., ON THE MANAGMAENr OF THiE GOVERNMENrT PENSION FUND IN
2006 38-43 (2006-07 Translation from Norwegian for Information Only).
39. Id. at 85-88.
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ride out any short-term market fluctuations." 40 While there has been much talk about
replicating the checks and balances adopted by the Norwegian Government Pension
Fund-Global, this move is not without substantial short-term destabilizing risks. As a
leading investment banker in New York conceded to this researcher, "those who advocate
a Norwegian solution clearly have not read the underpinning rules governing its opera-
tion."4 1 Many of the recent share acquisitions in global financial investment banks are
substantial. The scale of individual contributions far exceeds the tolerance limits provided
to Norwegian fund managers. Disinvestment on the scale necessary to ensure compliance
with Norwegian norms could be exceptionally problematic.
A related problem centers on the activist approach taken by the Norwegian fund in the
exercise of its obligations as a shareholder. Forcing SWFs to demonstrate independence
from political considerations by adopting purely passive positions cuts against the trajec-
tory of responsible corporate governance; a trajectory which has been taken very seriously
by the Norwegian Pension Fund-Global.42 Within the academy, this emasculating im-
perative has gone even further, with the suggestion that SWFs should be automatically
stripped of ownership rights.4 3 Two leading U.S. academics have proposed what they
term a minimalist solution. They argue that the political problem of how to ensure that
"market-based capitalist regimes are protected against incursion by new mercantilist re-
gimes" can be resolved by "a simple corporate governance fix" whereby "the equity of a
US firm acquired by a foreign government controlled entity would lose its voting rights,
but would regain them when transferred to non-state ownership." 44 Forcing SWFs to
disengage from ownership responsibility is unlikely to solve one key dimension of the
40. Interview with Thomas Ekeli, in Oslo, (Apr. 11, 2008). The evidence to date of the risk of sudden
capital outflows derives not from funds such as Norway's but those based in the South Pacific. A fund estab-
lished in the Pacific island of Nauru invested solely in 'lumpy' real estate, while that of Tonga consisted of
three holdings in major US corporations. In both cases, not surprisingly, the result was major losses. See Eric
Le Borgne & Paulo Medas, Sovereign Wealth Funds in the Pacific Island Countries: Macro-Fiscal Linkages 20
(IMF Working Paper Series, Paper No. 07/297, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1087176. There is demonstrable difference in the quality of the fund managers brought in to run
the major operations in Russia, China, and the Gulf. Notwithstanding their expertise and standing, however,
there is no way of predicting whether these agents have the capacity to moderate the behavior of their politi-
cal masters in the event of an escalating trade or diplomatic dispute.
41. Interview with Investment Banker, in New York, (Apr. 25, 2008).
42. Most controversially, the Ethics Council of the Norwegian Pension Fund-Global advocated that the
Fund disinvest from Walmart. This recommendation centered on fears that Walmart's supply chain manage-
ment was defective and could implicate the corporation, and therefore the fund as the owner of its shares, in
the violation of International Labor Organization's working condition standards. See generally Chesterman,
supra note 37. It has also divested its $500 million stake in Rio Tinto because of concerns that the manage-
ment of the world's biggest gold mine led to unacceptable and unethical environmental degradation. See
Press Release, Norwegian Ministry of Finance, The Government Pension Fund Divests its Holding in Min-
ing Firm (Sept. 9, 2008). Significantly, Rio Tinto is not involved in the operational management of the mine,
which is in Indonesia. On the same day, the Ministry of Finance rejected a request to divest from Monsanto
because of concerns over child labor, citing improvements in corporate governance. Rolleiv Solholm, Pension
Fund Divests its Holdings in Rio Tinto, NORWAY Posr (Online), Oct. 9, 2008, http://www.norwaypost.no/cgi-
bin/norwaypost/imaker? id=191807.
43. See Gilson, supra note 17, at 10. But see Skancke, supra note 36, at 6 (stating that "we see no cause for
regulations that would restrict the present investment activities of our Fund, or any regulation imposing
restrictions on SWF over and above those applying to non-SWAF investors").
44. Gilson, supra note 17, at 10.
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crisis-the failure of institutional investors to take their ownership responsibilities seri-
ously enough. Indeed, as will be explored below, it is likely to exacerbate it.
A second wider source of concern centers on the complex relationship between SWFs
and financial engineers. While the IMF has broadly welcomed SVFs, it has expressed
concern that any tie up of private equity, combined with the danger associated with short-
ing particular stocks or sectors, could prove exceptionally destabilizing. 45 Its Director of
Research has pointed out that "as sovereign funds grow in importance, they effectively
become a significant unregulated set of intermediaries that may or may not invest with
hedge funds in the future."46 An inevitable consequence is the potential amplification of
market manipulation. 47 Despite regulatory suspicion that hedge funds may have colluded
to put financial stocks into play,4s there is no evidence that SWFs have either funded or
directly engaged in such short-term asset management strategies. As with state-controlled
corporations seeking to make strategic acquisitions, one further issue surrounds the risk of
insider trading because SWFs may have access to and take advantage of price-sensitive
information. Again, it is essential to emphasize that this risk is purely hypothetical. There
is no evidence that any SWF has engaged in such activity.
Paradoxically, the increasingly shrill rhetoric emanating from recipient countries rein-
forces the dynamic interplay between SWs and private equity. Some funds have sought
to head-off criticism of disguised motives by developing indirect conduits, most notably
through a deepening of collaborative ventures. The Chinese Investment Corporation has
contributed to a major fund established by J.C. Flowers.49 The Government Investment
Corporation of Singapore has emerged as a key underwriter of a similar fund established
by Texas Pacific Group.50 Investment in distressed financial stocks and the leveraged ac-
quisition of committed senior debt at fire-sale prices provides both sets of institutional
actors with a clear commercial opportunity. It is a thought that is captivating private
equity mandarins. The Abu Dhabi Investment Authority will, in time, "effectively replace
Wall Street" according to Guy Hands, the head of Terra Firma, a leading private equity
45. Simon Johnson, The Rise of Sovereign Wealth Funds, FIN. & DEV., Sept. 2007, at 56.
46. Id.
47. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has flagged the asymmetrical informational issue and
its application to Sovereign Wealth Funds and, more problematically, state-controlled funds with privileged
access to market sensitive information. See Ethiopis Tafara, Dir., Office of Int'l Affairs, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n, Testimony Concerning Foreign Government Investment in the U.S. Economy and Financial Sec-
tor before the Fin. Serv. Comm., U.S. House of Representatives (Mar. 5, 2008).
48. The dissemination of totally unfounded rumors in March 2008 destabilized one of Britain's most con-
servative lenders, HBOS. The "trash and cash" operation prompted the Financial Services Authority (FSA)
to release a terse statement castigating the market manipulation and promising a thorough investigation. See
Ruth Sutherland et al., Inside the Hunt for the City's Bank Raiders, OBSERVER, Mar. 23, 2008, at 22-23. As a
consequence, the FSA has introduced rules necessitating greater disclosure of shorting strategies. See Press
Release, Financial Services Authority, Financial Services Authority Introduces Disclosure Regime for Signifi-
cant Short Positions in Companies Undertaking Rights Issues (June 13, 2008). The SEC has gone further,
banning short selling in nineteen major financial stocks. See Temporary Action to Respond to Market Devel-
opments, Exchange Act Release No. 58,166 (July 15, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2008/
34-58166.pdf.
49. Rick Carew, Beiing Fund Will Take Private Equity Plunge, WALL ST. J., May 27, 2008, at C3.
50. John Jannarone, GIC, Via Private Equity,Targets Emerging Markets, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Apr. 17, 2008,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 120837228322320301.html.
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provider. 5 1 Although tinged with hyperbole, it is indicative of growing interdependence.5 2
The linkage magnifies, however, the opacity problems associated with the acquisition and
divestiture of portfolio companies. If the aim of policymakers is to limit the short-term
nature of contemporary market practice, it is surely counter-productive to force an ar-
ranged marriage between two largely unregulated sectors of the financial economy.
B. THE EXERCISE OF SoFr PoWER
SWFs represent a fundamental shift in market dynamics precisely because of the (po-
tential) fusion of political and commercial imperatives. Their growth provides confirming
evidence that the claim that the triumph of liberalism and global diffusion of western
economic policies would inevitably lead to the demise of the state is, at best, premature.5 3
For the larger established funds there is no evidence that investment strategies differ in
substance from those of traditional pension funds. Indeed it is arguable that any short-
term attempt to destabilize the market would be exceptionally counter-productive to
longer-term interests precisely because the initial exit could easily be traced. The boom in
commodity prices in particular, however, compounds the perception that investment
strategies could be used to advance the potential exercise of political soft power. 54 A num-
ber of plausible concerns arise in this regard. Corporate takeovers and the acquisition of
strategic stakes (particularly if accompanied by board rights) give state actors potential
access to proprietary intellectual capital. Without appropriate and enforceable checks and
balances, misuse of this information could be disseminated to a wider range of national
champions. A related risk is that the investment could influence strategic imperatives (for
example by skewing lending priorities towards projects favored by donor countries) thus
undermining the efficacy of specific corporate governance controls.5 5
The more aggressive investment strategies developed by China and Russia, in particu-
lar, but also from authoritarian governments in the Gulf, have exacerbated these concerns.
While there is no evidence that any SWFs have ever been used to further political ambi-
tions, ascertaining the motives of secretive or authoritarian governments is a notoriously
imprecise exercise. Notwithstanding the advantages of increased disclosure in helping to
divine intent, it is important to emphasize that SWFs form only one component of state
economic influence. The opacity level increases when strategic investments derive from
state-controlled corporations. It clouds over completely when the acquisition comes from
business oligarchs with discernible but informal links with political power in authoritarian
regimes. The point here is that restricting SWF acquisitions or limiting voting rights to
demonstrate passivity could lead to the expansion of even more opaque investment mech-
51. Martin Arnold, Wealth Funds Fill Bank Gap for Buy-Out Groups, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 28, 2008, at
1.
52. The involvement of a Texas Pacific Group founding partner on the international advisory panel set up
by the Singaporean SWF, Temesek Holdings, indicates this. The governance procedures allow for
Bonderman (or any other advisor) to be excused from deliberations in cases where a conflict of interest exists.
See Israel, supra note 35.
53. For original formulation, see FRANCIS FUKUYAAIA, T1HE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (Max-
well Macmillan 1992).
54. See JOSEPH S. NmT, JR., SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD PoLITICS (Public Affairs
2004).
55. See IMF, Work Agenda, svpra note 32, at 14.
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anisms. The governance debate and its implications will be further explored below. First,
it is necessary to evaluate how the national interest is defined, the impact of SWF invest-
ment on that definition, and the consequence for capital flows.
C. THE PROTECTION OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST
Many countries impose restrictions on foreign direct investment in parts of the critical
infrastructure because of strategic and cultural factors. These can include restrictions in
dual-use technologies or protection of core communication portals, such as media mar-
kets, from undue foreign influence.5 6 The restrictions can be complete, partial, or entail a
review process that, in turn, may or may not privilege investment (dependent on the sali-
ence of wider security concerns). The problem centers on a lack of agreement on what
"critical" means and the parameters that governments can use to define "national security"
interests. 57 The inevitable consequence is a lack of transparency in investment review
process. This lack of transparency makes the entire process susceptible to political and
economic populism. The frameworks and the extent to which inward investment is com-
promised by injudicious political rhetoric are now evaluated by way of two extended
examples.
1. The United States
Concern over national security issues has become particularly acute in the United
States. The imperatives governing the "war on terror" have sharpened the potential con-
flict between the benefits of global exchange and the impact on national security. The
current legal framework dates from the 1988 "Exxon-Florio" amendment to the Defense
Production Act.5 8 The amendment authorized presidential right of veto if a foreign in-
vestment risked the integrity of national defense. 59 The investigative authority was dele-
gated to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), an inter-
agency agency established thirteen years earlier to further inward investment. From the
start two competing philosophical worldviews were in conflict.60 As one of those involved
in compiling the reports commented recently, "one side [representing Treasury and
facilitative trade agencies] never saw a deal they didn't like, while the other [initially De-
56. See U.S. GEN. AcCOUNTING OFFICE, FOREIGN INvESTMENT: LAWS AND POLICIES REGULATING
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN 10 COUNTRIES (Feb. 2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08320.
pdf [hereinafter GAO Foreign Investinent]; OECD, PRO1ECTION OF "CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE" AND
THE ROLE OF LNVESTMENT POLICIES RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY 6 (May 2008), available at http://
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/2/41/40700392.pdf [hereinafter OECD Protection].
57. OECD, TRANSPARENCY AND PREDICTABILITY FOR INVESTMENT POLICIES ADDRESSING NATIONAL
SECURITY CONCERNS: A SURVEY OF PRACTICES (May 2008) [hereinafter OECD Transparency].
58. 50 U.S.C. § 2170 (West 2007).
59. Id.
60. The potential dysfunction was highlighted to two critical reports by the Government Accountability
Office. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEFENSE TRADE: MITIGATING NATIONAL SECURITY CON-
CERNS UNDER EXON-FLORIO COULD BE IMPROVED (Sept. 2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.
items/d02736.pdf; U.S. GEN. ACCOUIN1TING OFFICE, DEFENSE TRADE: ENHANCEMENTS TO TI.iE IMPLE-
MENTATION OF ExON-FLORIO COULD STRENGTHEN THE LAW'S EFFECTIVENESS (Sept. 2005), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05686.pdf.
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partment of Defense but extended in 1988 to include Department of Justice and Depart-
ment of Homeland Security in 2003] never saw a deal they did." 61
The problems are exacerbated by a failure to define what constitutes national security in
either the underpinning legislation or regulatory procedures. 62 There are of course sound
policy reasons for such an approach. Most notably, it gives policymakers exceptional flexi-
bility. Nevertheless, the abortive investment by state-owned Dubai Ports World in
P&O's stevedore operations on the U.S. eastern seaboard in 2005 demonstrates the unin-
tended consequences. The failure to disentangle the national interest and to order poten-
tially incommensurable commercial and military imperatives severely compromised the
integrity of the regulatory system. 63 The controversy centered on the interpretation of an
Executive Order. It had opined "certain national infrastructures are so vital that their
incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating impact on the defense or economic
security of the United States." 64 Despite the support of the Bush administration, political
pressure convinced Dubai that it had, in reality, little choice but to divest. This political
pressure demonstrates that the voluntary system of review could be short-circuited by
policy entrepreneurs.
The Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 was designed to address this
defect by codifying the entire foreign investment review process.6 5 It reinforces earlier
Executive Order imperatives in the definition of critical infrastructure. Significantly, fi-
nancial services industry is omitted from the list of controlled sectors in the primary legis-
lation. Individual agencies have maintained the sector as a component of critical
infrastructure. As such, the CFIUS remains a politically charged arena. Moreover, the
underpinning legislation specifically calls on CFIUS to take into consideration "'the rela-
tionship of the acquiring country with the United States, specifically on its record of co-
operating in counterterrorism efforts." 6 6 This degree of politicization is particularly
problematic for Chinese domiciled investors.
The scale of distrust was already evidenced in blocking the sale of a Californian-based
oil company to the Chinese National Oil Corporation in 2006. This unease re-emerged
in the machinations surrounding the recent attempted takeover of 3Com, a leading tele-
communications firm. The deal was structured to give the Chinese conglomerate Huawei
just 16.5 percent of the stock with the remainder held by a U.S.-based private equity
group, Bain Capital. 6 7 It was derailed, in part, because of fears expressed outside the
CFIUS process that the integrity of network security protocols could not be protected.
61. Interview with confidential source, in Washington, DC (May 28, 2008). Moreover, the OECD has
found no evidence of specific country evaluation of how investment policy actually helps or impedes the
furtherance of national security considerations. See OECD Protection, supra note 56, at 7.
62. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security, for example, defines as part of its mandate the need to
protect "systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or
destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on [national] security." OECD Pro-
tection, supra note 56, at 3.
63. See generally, EDWARD M. GRAiAM & DAVID M. MARCHICK, U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOR-
EIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (Peterson Institute for International Economics 2006), available at http://book-
store.petersoninstitute.org/book-store/3918.html.
64. Exec. Order No. 13,010, 61 Fed. Reg. 37,347 (July 15, 1996).
65. Foreign Investment & National Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-49, 121 Stat. 246.
66. See GAO Foreign Investment, supra note 56, at 34.
67. Stephanie Kirchgaessner, U.S. Insiders Point to Bain Errors over 3Com, FIN. TLmES (London), Mar. 3,
2008, at 30.
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The alleged links between Huawei and the Chinese Peoples' Liberation Army represented
an even more nebulous concern. Recognition that these concerns could not be readily
dismissed-at least in the court of public opinion-led to the withdrawal of the offer for
$2.2 billion (U.S.).68
Be this as it may, it is questionable whether a Chinese-controlled investment vehicle, in
particular, can gain ongoing political support in Washington absent a fundamental over-
arching agreement on how to deal with expanded state reach. 69 Administration support
appears conditional on adherence to a further generic set of principles that operate outside
of the formal legal and regulatory guidelines that underpin the CFIUS procedure. This
adherence requires an explicit commitment that "investment decisions should be based
solely on commercial grounds, rather than to advance, directly or indirectly, the geopoliti-
cal goals of the controlling government."70 According to the U.S. Treasury, "[g]reater
information disclosure... in areas such as purpose, investment objectives, institutional ar-
rangements, and financial information... can help reduce uncertainty and build trust in
recipient countries."'71 While national security has been deliberately framed to give "the
broadest latitude" possible, reinstating the financial sector does give rise to understandable
ire on the part of SWFs that see the current debate of geo-political gamesmanship devoid
of policy cohesion.72
It is also important to note that there are important structural and policy differences
between the 3Com deal and those recently consummated within the financial sector. 73
The recent financial acquisitions have been scoped to ensure that they remain below
mandatory government review thresholds. Under U.S. law, if there are no accompanying
voting rights (or the portfolio investment is below 10 percent), then the investment is
automatically deemed passive and therefore not subject to formal review. Secondly, as
noted above, the passage of the Foreign Investment and National Security Act explicitly
deleted financial services from the list of prescribed sectors. This change does not mean,
however, that monetary policymakers lack the capacity to block financial investments.
The Bank Holding Company Act requires U.S. Federal Reserve approval before direct or
indirect investment of more than 25 percent of voting shares can be authorized. In addi-
tion, a controlling interest that is defined as having 10 percent of voting shares can trigger
68. Id.; Stephanie Kirchgaessner, Washington Obstacle Course Sees Chinese Companies Re-Examine Their U.S.
Ambitions, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 4, 2008, at 30.
69. Evan Bayh, chairman of the Senate Banking Sub-Committee on Security and International Trade and
Investment, suggests that the current regulatory approach is "naive." Evan Bayh, Tiie for Sovereign Wealth
Rules, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 2008, at A26. Three members of the House Financial Services Panel, including
its chairman, Barney Frank, have written to the U.S. Treasury Secretary asking for confirmation that the 10%
threshold will not be interpreted literally. Associated Press, Lawmakers Want CF1US Rules Clarified, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 14, 2008, at A12; see also Alvarez, supra note 32.
70. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Treasury Reaches Agreement on Principle for Sovereign Wealth
Fund Investment with Singapore and Abu Dhabi (Mar. 20, 2008).
71. Id.
72. Oral comments provided to the author by a representative of a conglomerate of SWFs at a seminar, on
which this paper is based, given to the International Monetary Fund, in Washington, D.C. (May 27, 2008).
73. It is also important to emphasize that the main source of foreign investment in the United States comes
from Europe, particularly the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. Despite the sharp spike in Sovereign
Wealth activity, as a sector it remains relatively small provider of overall foreign direct investment in the
United States. See GAO Foreign Investment, supra note 56, at 8.
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a formal review. The critical question is whether the CFIUS can or should have the
capacity to second-guess the U.S. Federal Reserve.
2. Australia
The global demand for resources has been central to Australia's relative insulation from
the effects of the credit crisis. The country has significant reserves of alumina, zircon, and
tantalum as well as liquid natural gas, nickel, and iron ore. Much of it lies in Western
Australia. The state is the world's leading producer of bauxite, rutile, and zircon. 74 West-
em Australia has the largest known reserves of nickel and the second largest supply of iron
ore, gold, bauxite, and diamonds. 7 5 The state has been a magnet for inward investment.
Between 1998 and 2007, mining operations expanded from $5 billion to $15 billion
(Aus.). 76 Chinese concerns have become some of the most significant competitors to the
dominant domestic holdings-BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto, which are dual listed on the
London market-and the increasingly important Fortescue Metals Group. China is now
Western Australia's most significant trading partner, both as consumer of its products and
provider of inward investment, particularly low metal content iron ore. While the invest-
ments to date have generally been structured as joint ventures, the number of hostile bids
for medium sized Australian operations has increased. 77 There are, of course, clear com-
mercial grounds for such an approach. From the Chinese corporate perspective, synergies
produce economies of scale, reduce dependency on the major Australian exporters, and
minimize the risk of reliance on volatile spot markets. Conversely, the facilitation of in-
ward capital flows may also depress prices in cases where the same entity extracts and uses
the resources. The fear expressed in Canberra centers on the fact that this linkage could
benefit disproportionately the customers of Australian resources, namely the Chinese.
The policy implications have sharpened because of a strategic raid by Chinalco and its
(junior) American partner, Alcoa, on the Rio Tinto share register in London, which was
itself the target of BHP Billiton's audacious attempt to consummate the largest takeover
in history. Legal advice to Chinalco held that the $12 billion (Aus.) raid was not covered
by either Australian law or policy. As a consequence, there was no requirement to notify
or seek prior federal approval. Two weeks after the raid, the Australian federal govern-
ment attempted to reconcile competing objectives by refining the principles used to evalu-
ate potentially controversial commercial deals. The effect, however, has been to introduce
uncertainty in the marketplace.
Under Australian law, foreign investment is evaluated under the Foreign Acquisitions
and Takeovers Act of 1975. The Act delegates the analytic function to a Foreign Invest-
ment Review Board (FIRB), an advisory arm of the Department of Treasury. 78 The prin-
ciples make clear that the FIRB retains an advisory role. Ultimate decision-making
74. Data supplied by the Department of Industry and Resources, Western Australia.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. The most significant example in this regard was the hostile bid of $1.36 billion (AUS) for control of
iron ore producer Midwest. Opposition to the deal related primarily to the price not the principle. See Jamie
Freed, Sinosteel Gets Control, Ibt Likely to Have Company at Midwest, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, July 8, 2008,
http://business.smh.com.au/business/sinosteel-gets-control-but-likely-to-have-company-at-miidwest-200807
08-3bu5.html.
78. Foreign Acquisition and Takeovers Act, 1975 (Ausd.).
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authority remains with the Treasurer. The principles do little to provide clarity. Indeed,
the clarification has politicized the issue and ratcheted up tension with Chinese
conglomerates.
The first principle covers the investor's independence from the relevant government (to
monitor for actual foreign government control).79 It is unclear what degree of indepen-
dence is deemed appropriate. Moreover, it is uncertain whether this provision could be
enforced against a publicly listed entity in which a state or regional government held a
formal but minority interest. Second, the Board will review the investor's litigation record
and "common standards of business behaviour" (i.e. the extent to which investor has
clearly expressed commercial objectives and the quality of its corporate governance).,s It
is equally uncertain whether this review process would apply to a newly listed corporation
or one with no previous litigation history. Third, the FIRB will assess the impact of the
investment on competition (to be determined in consultation with the Australian Con-
sumer and Competition Commission).8 ' Such an approach may have value in the case of
major acquisitions, such as BHP Billiton's proposed takeover of Rio Tinto. It is question-
able what impact the transfer of a mid-tier company could have on competition policy,
making the provision largely irrelevant unless invoked for short-term political reasons.
Fourth, the FIRB will evaluate the impact of the proposed investment on government
revenue or other policies, including tax and environmental protection. 82 It is hard to see
how this approach could be utilized only against state-owned investment vehicles without
compromising equity of treatment principles. Fifth, FIRB will evaluate national security
considerations, which includes undefined "strategic interests."8 3 Sixth, the board will de-
termine the impact on the operation and direction of Australian business, "as well as its
contribution to the Australian economy and broader community," which includes taking
into consideration "the interests of employees, creditors and other stakeholders."8 4
The Federal Treasurer, Wayne Swan, has sought to display his pro-inward investment
credentials and displace concern by suggesting his office is swamped by Chinese propos-
als. He has publicly stated that the government had approved a Chinese investment once
every nine days since coming to office.8 5 He also intimated, however, that Chinese invest-
ment proved exceptionally complex; it required a more detailed examination, which in
turn allowed for an expansion of the timeframe for approval beyond thirty days.s6 The
79. AUSTRALIAN LABOR PARTY, PRINCIPLEs GUIDING CONSIDERATION OF FOREIGN GOVERNMEN-T RE-







85. See Wayne Swan, Treasurer, Commonwealth of Australia, Speech delivered at Australia-China Business
Council in Melbourne (July 4, 2008), available at http://www.treasurer.gov.au/.
86. Under Australian law, foreign investors can withdraw an application if it has not been accepted within
the timeframe, thereby guaranteeing confidentiality. In one recent case involving Sinosteel, a Chinese-based
corporation, the government refused the request for withdrawal and allowed the proposed investment to be
gazetted. According to a senior representative of the Chinese firm involved, this decision was contrary to its
wishes and demonstrated "discriminatory practice." Interview with Jiang Baocai, Sinosteel, in Beijing (Sept.
5, 2008). The government eventually approved an application limiting the investment to 49.99 percent on
the grounds that a controlling interest would be contrary to competition policy. Rebecca Sharp, Sinosteel Gets
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proposals have generated considerable ire in Western Australia. They also suggest that
linking the national interest to the need to separate supply and demand misunderstands
the dynamics of the mining industry. This message is precisely the one the Federal Trea-
surer promulgated in a recent speech in Melbourne:
The key is that investments are consistent with Australia's aim of maintaining a mar-
ket-based system in which companies are responsive to shareholders and in which
investment and sales decisions are driven by market forces rather than external strate-
gic or political considerations .... Our predisposition is to more carefully consider
proposals by consumers to control existing producing firms. We usually welcome
and encourage some participation by the buyer . . . [blut we need to ensure that
investment is consistent with Australia's aim of ensuring that decisions continue to be
driven by commercial considerations and that Australia remains a reliable supplier in
the future to all current and potential trading partners. 87
The rationale for such an interventionist approach was explicitly justified by reference
to the international debate on the regulation of SWFs. The empirical basis for such an
assertion is hard to justify.88 Not surprisingly, it is a theme also developed by Chinese and
Chinese-linked mining concerns. Interviews conducted by this researcher in Beijing in
recent months make it clear that both components are both puzzled and annoyed at what
they perceive to be an admixture of discriminatory practices, bad faith, and policy incoher-
ence. One of the most significant investments in Western Australia, for example, has
come from a subsidiary of CITIC Pacific, a listed Hong Kong corporation, in which the
Chinese government retains a 57.66 percent passive stake.89 The director of CITIC Pa-
cific's Australian operation is scathing about what he sees as the apparent lack of knowl-
edge in Canberra of either Chinese realities or the economics of iron ore extraction.
Wang Gongcheng believes that Australian mindset remains wedded to outmoded concep-
tions of Chinese management:
Things are very different now to when I first negotiated the agreement for China's
first substantial foreign investment [with Hammersley Mines in Chennar, now a joint
Approval to Life Stake in Australia's Murchison, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2008, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/
ff2feae0-883e-l ldd-bl14-0000779fd18c.html.
87. Swan, soipra note 85.
88. As with the United States, the rate of Chinese investment considerably lags international competitors.
In 2006-2007, the United States was the single largest investor in Australia with $45 billion (US). In total
$156.4 billion (US) were invested, with China contributing only $10 billion (US). Michael Stutchbury,
Swan's Line in the Sand Risks Turning Chinese Investors Away, AUSTRALIAN, Sept. 5, 2008, http://www.theaus-
tralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,24295032-30538,00.htmL. According to one of Australia's leading politi-
cal economists, Peter Drysdale, an emeritus political economy professor at the Australian National
University, "the current ambiguities are damaging to Australia's economic and long-term political-strategy
interests." Peter Drysdale & Christopher Findlay, Chinese Foreign Direct Investment in Australia: Policy
Issues for the Resource Sector 30 (Sept. 4, 2008) (Unpublished Paper for Presentation to Crawford School
Public Seminar, Australian National University). Drysdale, along with Christopher Findlay, argues in a re-
cent paper: "Unnecessary regulation of capital from this source into the Australian market will not only be
detrimental to Australian economic interests by driving it to other markets, possibly less supportive of reform
of corporate structures and corporate behaviour, but is likely to encourage a retreat to appeals to the power of
the state in ways that are likely to be damaging to both our long-term economic and political interests." Id. at
28-29.
89. C. Chan, Citic Pacific Bailout is Best Option, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 20, 2008, A2
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venture with Rio Tinto]. Economic decision-making is now devolved totally to the
enterprises themselves, which have responsibility for sourcing the necessary financ-
ing. In such circumstances, it is understandable that enterprises are seeking to secure
supply. It is in their commercial interests to do so. 90
While it is arguable that CITIC Pacific could be construed as a private company, it
cannot be vouchsafed because CITIC Beijing controls a 30 percent stake. 91 For main-
land-based corporations, navigating the foreign investment review process in Australia has
become exceptionally problematic. The General Manager of the International Coopera-
tion Department at Sinosteel, for example, argues "that on the surface the Australian gov-
ernment guidelines have not changed," but its treatment indicates, to him, a profound
change in policy has occurred. 9 2 The decision to limit Sinosteel's acquisition in a neigh-
boring mining corporation is inconsistent with OECD guidelines and with Australia's
own corporation law that mandates a takeover offer if holdings increase beyond 20 per-
cent. Not only does such an arrangement severely limit Sinosteel's capacity to deliver
clear commercial objectives, it also curtails the systematic development of the infrastruc-
ture and curtails the emergence of competition. In a scathing aside, the Sinosteel manager
wonders, with reason, whether current policy "can be consistent with Australia's concep-
tion of itself as a market economy."9 3
D. THE LIMITS OF TRANSPARENCY
The most considered policy framework to address the symbiotic nature of the problem
of SWF regulation has been proposed by the European Union. 94 Its proposed code of
conduct suggested the need for common disclosure standards in both host and recipient
countries. These are designed, specifically, to ensure policy coherence within recipient
nations (i.e. a common definition of what constitutes the public interest). There are sound
policy reasons for advocating such an approach. The European Union President, Jose
Manuel Barroso, has warned that support for open markets is waning across the commu-
nity.95 In this context, the absence of an overarching agreement on what constitutes the
national interest risks the further politicization of foreign investment review processes
across the European Union. 96 The fear is that any further advance of economic populism
and protectionist rhetoric at national level may distort the authority and credibility of
90. Interview with Wang Gongcheng, CP Mining Mgmt. Prop. Ltd., in Beijing (Sept. 5, 2008).
91. Adding to the confusion is the extent to which the protection of the national interest entails investment
from non-state actors from ostensibly democratic regimes. This situation is far from hypothetical. Russian
oligarchs have also moved aggressively into the Australian resources sector.
92. Interview with Jiang Baocai, supra note 86.
93. Id.
94. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, supra note 25.
95. Lionel Barber & Tony Barber, Barroso Protectionism Alert, FIN. TMES (London), March 3, 2008, at 1.
This framework echoed earlier calls at a summit in London between the leaders of Britain, France, Germany,
and Italy to reject "futile attempts to stem financial globslisation." Barroso Tells EU Leaders to Avoid Protection-
irm, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 31, 2008, at 1; see also Philip Stephens, Uncomfortable Truths for a New World of
Them and Us, FIN. TLNIES (London), May 30, 2008, at 11.
96. The chairman of China Investment Corporation, Lou Jiwei, has ruled out investment across parts of
Europe because he "feels extremely unwelcome there." Bob Davis, China Investment-Fund Head Says Focus is
on 'Portfolios', WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 2008, at A13.
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wider competition policy. This shift, argues the European Commission, is counter-pro-
ductive to collective strategic interests. Such lofty aspiration is not, however, matched by
realities on the ground.
As the OECD has commented, transparency "involves offering concerned parties the
opportunity to comment on new laws and regulations, communicating the policy objec-
tives of proposed changes, allowing time for public review and providing a means to com-
municate with relevant authorities."97 Moreover the OECD maintains the need for
international cooperation. This cooperation is necessary "to ensure policy transparency
by defining common standards [of procedural fairness] and providing support for multilat-
eral peer review and capacity building."9 8 The OECD's table of procedural transparency
and predictability speaks volumes about serious wider deficiencies in the accountability
regime at national recipient level. The lack of formal requirements to publicly announce
outcomes, table reports to legislative bodies, or publish an annual report with sufficient
information to ascertain review pattern is the norm in all countries surveyed with the
exception of the United States and (partially) Australia.99 Introducing policy changes in
an incremental manner through bilateral agreements, as in the United States, runs counter
to OECD principles. In Australia, the articulation of FIRB principles was not subject to
external debate or validation. Rather, the initiative was presented as a bureaucratic clarifi-
cation. As such, it did not require prior notification to or consultation with interested
parties. In both cases, the introduction of new criteria to adjudication of state-owned or
controlled investment entities reflect discriminatory impulses.
Given their role in providing liquidity to the financial sector, it is inevitable that SWFs
have entered onto the political radar. As examined above, however, additional geopolitical
concerns complicate matters considerably. It is entirely appropriate for national govern-
ments to protect legitimate national interests. If the process is opaque, though, there may
be a concomitant undermining of legitimacy. Authority requires clearly defined parame-
ters. In addition, the rationale must be explained and the rules applied in a proportionate
impartial manner. To do otherwise obviates longstanding principles of equity in interna-
tional investment. As such, proposals to regulate SWFs must be linked to foreign direct
investment processes and to a wider recalibration of what is expected of institutional
shareholders in the control of major corporations. At the same time, it is also clear that
the generation of new norms or principles of best practice need to take account of chang-
ing power relations. The transfer of capital from south to north and east to west partially
rebalances the center of political and economic power and reveals, in the process, glaring
deficiencies in western conceptions of what constitutes (or should constitute) regulatory
best practice. 0 0
97. OECD Transparency, supra note 57, at 2.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 9.
100. For recently announced plans to change the governance structure of the IMF reflect and reinforce this
broader shift see IMF EXECLrIVE BOARD REPORT, REFORM OF QUOTA AND VOICE IN THE INriERNA-
TIONAL MONETARY FUND (Mar. 28, 2009).
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IV. Achieving Accountability
While SWFs have traditionally shunned the media spotlight, there are already clear
signs of bristling at what is seen as a partial and self-serving rewriting of the rules gov-
erning financial globalization. This trend is most notable in the case of the Abu Dhabi
Investment Authority (ADIA). The Emirate remains deeply suspicious of the benefits of
disclosure; its website consists of five sparsely populated pages. 01 Nonetheless a clear
message has been transmitted to Washington. The investment authority has stated explic-
itly that the Abu Dhabi "government has never and will never use its investment organiza-
tions or individual investments as a foreign-policy-tool." 102 It emphasizes that financial
experts manage 80 percent of its investments. 103 Further, ADIA "has operated predomi-
nantly as a passive investor, with the overwhelming share of its portfolio consisting of
minority stakes in companies that have included no control rights, no board seats and no
involvement in the management or direction of the receiving companies." 104 The phras-
ing is instructive in its ambiguity. The passivity is predominant but not exclusive. It is
unclear whether the portfolio balance is based on size or value. Furthermore, the lack of
control, board representation, and directional guidance may not necessarily be used in all
cases. More generally, it is mistaken to believe that the absence of voting rights precludes
the exertion of influence. No entrenched management team is likely to ignore the voice
or (perceived) interests of significant shareholders. The problem is that the current lack
of disclosure means that there is no way of knowing what advice, if any, has been dis-
pensed. Likewise there is no ongoing mechanism to hold the fund to account.
Along with the mollification has come an unsubtle warning. The ADIA cautions that
"[iln a world thirsty for liquidity, receiving nations should be mindful of the signals sent
through protectionist rhetoric and rash regulation."1S The chairman of Dubai World has
argued that the introduction of formal regulatory oversight is unwarranted and contrary
to the interests of recipient states.'0 6 Similarly, the chief executive of Dubai International
Capital, which holds strategic stakes in both Standard Chartered and HSBC, has bluntly
stated that leading investment banks may not be able to survive without SWF financing.107
He told a conference "it would take a lot more money [than already secured from Abu
Dhabi, Singapore, and Kuwait] to rescue Citigroup"-one of the most over-extended in-
vestment houses and the first to seek recapitalization. 108
101. See Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, http://www.adia.ae/default.asp (last visited Jan. 28, 2009).




106. Sultan Ahmed Bin Sulayem argued that "If somebody comes with regulations that make it difficult for
someone from certain geographical locations to invest in Europe or the west, people will take their invest-
ment somewhere else." BBC News, Dubai Fnnd Hits Back at Criticism (Feb. 29, 2008), http://news.bbc.co.uk/
l/hi/business/7271007.stm. He also claimed however that political interference was a red herring. "If you
put a politician in charge of an investment, believe me, that investment fund will not last for a very long
time." Id.
107. See Mirna Sleiman & Andrew Critchlow, Gulf Investors May Not Save Citigroup, Dubai Executive Says,
MARKEFFrWATCIi, Mar. 4, 2008, available at http://www.marketwatch.com/News/Story/gulf-investors-may-
not-save/story.aspx?guid={6C374435-53 14-4A8E-B689-B8916D529B7B}.
108. Id.
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Similar sentiment is evident in Beijing. The vice president of the China Investment
Corporation, Jesse Wang, has expressed irritation at the calls for a code of conduct, saying
it was "unfair" and "[t]he claim that sovereign-wealth funds are causing threats to state
security and economic security are groundless.... We don't need outsiders to come tell us
how we should act."10 9 The IMF is exceptionally cognizant of the sensitivities involved in
brokering a solution. It has signaled that a heavy-handed one-sided approach could back-
fire. The IMF Deputy Managing Director, John Lipsky, has argued that "[i]f there were a
sense that somehow 'best practices' were decided by someone else and dictated to the
funds, that could be extremely counterproductive."110 It was against this volatile back-
ground that the IMF and representatives of twenty-six SWVFs agreed to a voluntary set of
guidelines in Santiago this September.
The Santiago principles set out the legal, institutional, and macroeconomic strategies
adopted by each fund, including information about the risk appetite. According to the co-
chair of the International Working Group drafting committee, the
governance and accountability arrangements give considerable comfort especially in
the area of the separation of operations of the sovereign wealth fund from its owner,
and the investment policies and risk management together with the other things are
intended to make it clear that sovereign wealth funds act from a commercial motive
and not other motives.1 11
Although no formal surveillance mechanism is envisaged, Hamid al Suwaidi, the co-chair
of the International Working Group and the Under Secretary at the Abu Dhabi Depart-
ment of Finance, gave an explicit assurance that compliance could be achieved: "this is a
voluntary set of practices. The sovereign wealth funds will publicly announce their adop-
tion of the GAPP once it's approved. And then it's for the public really to see where the
respective funds are adhering to these principles and practices."' 12 What that means in
practice is exceptionally difficult to determine.
The governance procedures followed by the Norwegian Government Pension
Fund-Global provides one potential way forward. Its terms of reference necessitate that
detailed information is provided about where it invests and how it exercises its ownership
109. Victoria Ruan, China's Investment Fund Pushes Back, Says G-7 Plan Is Unfair, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 2008,
at A6; Edward Wong, Turning the Tables: China Scolds U.S.A New Confidence in Economic Talks, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., June 17, 2008, at 1; see also Stephen Schwartznan, Reject Sovereign Wealth Funds At Your Peril, FIN.
TIMES (London), June 20, 2008, at 9.
110. Bob Davies, US Pushes Sovereign Funds to Open to Outside Scrutiny, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 2008, at Al.
111. IWG Press Conference Call, supra note 16 (comment by David Murray).
112. Id. (comment by Hamad al Suwaidi). At the same time, distinct limits on disclosure are envisaged. The
Australian representative noted:
sovereign wealth funds have to compete in the market, and there are two implications of that, one
in terms of the confidentiality of arrangements that other people make with sovereign wealth
funds and the protection of that confidentiality, and the confidentiality of their day-to-day trans-
acting, but also the notion that if other parties in the market beheve that a sovereign wealth fund
can be forced to disclose certain information, then that would close down the range of people who
would be prepared to deal with sovereign wealth funds.
So disclosure is important, but as with any other institutional investor, there must be a limit
which protects confidentiality of dealings for sovereign wealth funds and their counter parties.
Id. (comment by David Murray).
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obligations.'1 3 While there are corporations that the fund simply will not invest in (for
example those involved in the arms trade), the fund also adopts a pragmatic teleological or
consequential approach to ownership. It "aims to be a leader in active ownership and
develop strategies and priorities which can win the support of others." 1 4 As its most
recent annual report makes clear, there is "[a]n expectation ... [by] the Norwegian people
and their political representatives-that the fund managers should act responsibility and
look after their financial assets in an ethically acceptable way." 115 Presuming the current
financial crisis stems primarily (if not exclusively) from ethical failure, then it necessarily
follows that it is only through responsible ownership that effective oversight can return.
As noted above, proposals to curtail voting rights risk delivering a suite of unintended
consequences, not least of which is a reversal of the work done by the Norwegian Pension
Fund-Global to embed integrity in its operating model. Moreover, forcing SWFs to ab-
dicate responsibility exacerbates the problem of the separation of ownership and control
within individual corporations and undermines the salience of regulatory theory.
The appropriate pricing of risk by private actors is arguably a commercial calculation.
It is necessary, however, for the managers, board directors, and owners of the providers of
structured finance products to recognize responsibility for a systemic crisis of confidence.
The seizing of the global securitization market demonstrates the malign consequences of
an emasculated approach to corporate governance and risk management. As the President
of Federal Reserve Bank of New York has pointed out, the "conventional risk-manage-
ment framework today focuses too much on the threat to a firm from its own mistakes and
too little on the potential for mistakes to be correlated across firms."116 In somewhat
plainer language, the European Commissioner for Internal Markets and Services refers to
a toxic cocktail of "stupidity, ignorance [and] misplaced optimism."'17 He suggests the
failure of internal risk management systems derive from that the fact that "[s]everal CEO's
of large financial institutions have admitted in their more candid moments that they did
not understand many of the new products that their firms were designing, underwriting
and trading." lI1 The strength of the elixir and the abandon with which it was consumed
also demonstrates the continuing failure of controls within and between four distinct or-
ders of accountability: legal, managerial, political, and bureaucratic.,1 9
113. NORGES BANK INVESTMENT" MANAGEIE1NT, 2007 SUMMARY ANNqU.AL REPORT 40 (2008), available at
http://www.norges-bank.no/upload/nbim/reports/2008/annual%20report%202007.pdf. This process is but-
tressed by an external Council on Ethics. The Council has the power to exclude a specific corporation in the
event that investment is deemed to carry a significant risk of complicity. This message has been exported in
recent weeks by the Governor of the Norges Bank. See Svein Ingvar Gjedrem, Governor, Cent. Bank of
Norway, Dinner Speech at the Conference for Investing for Future: Ethics and the Government Pension
Fund-Global UJan. 16, 2008); Kristin Halvorsen, Norway's Sovereign Fund Sets an Ethical Example, FiN. TwIEs
(London), Feb. 15, 2008, at 9.
114. NORGES BANK INVESTMENT MANAGEiMENT, supra note 113, at 41.
115. Id. at 40.
116. Timothy Geithner, President & CEO, Fed. Reserve Bank of New York, Remarks at the Economic
Club of New York: Reducing Systemic Risk in a Dynamic Financial System (June 9, 2008) [hereinafter
Geithner Remarks].
117. McCreevy Speech, supra note 3.
118. Id; see also Volcker, supra note 7.
119. Barbara S. Romsek & Melvin J. Dubnick, Accountability in the Public Sector: Lessons from the Challenger
Tragedy, 47 PUB. AD.sIN. REV. 227 (1987); for application of accountability model to corporate sector, see
Melvin J. Dubnick, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Search for Accountable Corporate Governance, in PRIVATE EQurrY,
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In the United States-the epicenter of the crisis-formal legal changes to corporate gov-
ernance practices in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, passed in the immediate aftermath of
the Enron and related financial reporting scandals, offered little more than symbolic reas-
surance. 120 Homogenous application of risk management procedures to attest internal
controls-mandated under section 404 of the Act-discounted application of critical think-
ing within both the corporation and the provider of external audit services.' 21 At a
broader level, a profound miscalculation of risk salience resulted in suboptimal regulatory
oversight. Deepening market integration ensured that risk, while diversified geographi-
cally, remained undiluted. From northern Norway to rural New South Wales, local coun-
cils bought securitized products on the basis of misplaced trust in the efficacy of internal
controls, the strength of independent directors to hold management to account, the attes-
tation provided by external auditors, legal due diligence, the assurances of those providing
corporate advisory services (including inherently conflicted rating agencies), and, ulti-
mately, the robustness of the overarching regulatory system.
The very fact that the crisis metastasized so quickly across regulatory systems is excep-
tionally revealing. The moral hazard can be traced to regulatory incoherence in both
rules and enabling regimes. The President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York has
conceded the U.S. regulatory system "has evolved into a confusing mix of diffused ac-
countability, regulatory competition, an enormously complex web of rules that create per-
verse incentives and leave huge opportunities for arbitrage and evasion, and creates the
risk of large gaps in our knowledge and authority."12 2 Moreover, the allegedly superior
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE DYNAMICS OF CAPITAL MARKET REGULATION 265, 284-88 (Justin
O'Brien, ed., Imperial College Press 2007) [hereinfter Sarbanes-Oxey].
120. MURRAY EDELMAN, TIiE SYMBOLIC USES OF PoLrrcs (Univ. of Illinois Press 1967); for application
of "symbolic lens" to Sarbanes-Oxley, see JUSTIN O'BRIEN, REDESIGNING FINANCIAL REGULATION: TIHE
POLITICS OF ENTFORCEMENT (2007); Sarbanes-Oxley, supra note 119.
121. See Dell'Ariccia, supra note 2, at 4, 11-12 (suggesting that "aggressive" lending at precisely the most
vulnerable part of the market was a critical amplifier. Paradoxically, lending standards on prime applications
simultaneously tightened, exacerbating a herding dynamic towards "gambling on speculative borrowers").
For a persuasive analysis that suggests "a large chunk of money has effectively been recycled to a developing
economy [of the poorest and least creditworthy borrowers] that exists within the United States own borders,"
see Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, Is the 2007 US Sub-Prime Financial Crisis So Different? An
International Historical Comparison (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13761, 2008), availa-
ble at http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/rogoff/files/Is._TheUSSubprime CrisisSo-Different.pdf.
On gambling impulses within investment banking, see KEVIN PHILLIPS, BAD MONEY: RECKLESS FINANCE,
FAILED POLITICS, AND Tun, GLOBAL CRISIS OF AMERICAN CAPITALISMS 19-22 (Penguin Group 2008);
SUSAN STRANGE, MAD MONEY (Manchester Univ. Press 1998); CHARLES P. KINDLEFERGER, MANIAS, PAN-
ICS, AND CRASHES: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES (4th ed. 2000). For managerial failings, see MICHAEL
POWER, ORGANIZED UNCERTAINTY: DESIGNING A WORLD OR RISK MANAGEAIEN- 9 (Oxford Univ. Press
2007). For empirical examples drawn from the millennium stock market analyst conflicts of interest, see
Charting an Icarian Flightpath, supra note 30. For more recent examples, see David Gauthier-Villars, The Buzz
Behind a Trading Scandal, WALL ST. J., May 24, 2008, at B3 (quoting the conclusion of an internal investiga-
tion into a recent multi-billion dollar trading scandal at French Bank Societe Generale that "despite numer-
ous alerts, which provided grounds for vigilance of investigation, the supervision... failed."); Amir Efrati, Are
Borrowers Free to Lie?, WALL ST. J., May 31, 2008, at B2 (citing the holding of Nat'l City Bank v. Hill, 2008
LEXIS 1668 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. May 23, 2008) that lenders had a prudential obligation to vet the representa-
tion of borrowers); see generally, Barbarians at the Vault. A Special Report on International Banking, ECONOMIST
(London), 16 May 2008, at 1-18, available at http://www.economist.com/opinion/displaystory.cfmstory-id=
11376185.
122. Geithner Remarks, supra note 116.
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responsive principles-based regulatory regime in the United Kingdom proved equally de-
fective in securing more than mechanistic (and ultimately valueless) compliance. 123
Despite two decades of corporate governance reform instituted, in the aftermath of
scandal, we are no closer to finding a moderating mechanism. Instead, the deleterious
effects of a dysfunctional system that allows for private profits and socialized risk have
emerged into clear view. Irrespective of the dimension, accountability proved elusive be-
cause of essentially ideographic and therefore incommensurable representations of what
fealty to the concept entails. The problem intensifies as one cascades through the mecha-
nisms used to measure accountability performance, such as transparency, responsibility,
and responsiveness.
124
The scale of the crisis has produced a paradigmatic tipping point. The unprecedented
nature of central bank intervention mirrors the admission by the chair of the most influen-
tial lobby group in investment banking that he "no longer believe[s] in the market's self-
healing power." 125 While it may be inopportune to engage in structural reform in the
midst of a crisis, 126 it is clear that the normative advantages of embedding a corporate
form of "associational democracy" without reference or subservience to wider societal
goals have been falsified. 27 At a more fundamental level, the restraining power associated
with enhanced transparency within and between each accountability dimension has also
been eroded. 128 The securitization of risk was, after all, perfectly legal: the risks were
disclosed but discounted by allegedly sophisticated investors, who, in the main, jettisoned
reason in the search for yield. A more appropriate and integrated response is to enhance
the narrative basis of accountability based on an agonistic understanding of what business
integrity means in practice. To be effective, this approach needs to transcend the desul-
tory reality of the much vaunted but now partially discredited "comply or explain" model
of financial reporting advanced by the United Kingdom. 129 This task is not as impossible
123. For a critique suggesting that the rules versus principles dichotomy is overstated, see David Kershaw,
Evading Enron: Taking Principles Too Seriously in Accounting Regulation, 68 MOD. L. REv. 594 (2005).
124. Mark Bovens, Two Concepts ofAccountability (Presented at Kettering Symposium on Public Accountability,
Dayton, OH, May 22-24, 2008), http://www2.ku.edu/-kupa/kettering/pdfs/Bovens.pdf.
125. Jeff Randall, When the Going Gets Tough, Banks Yelp for Nanny, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Mar. 26, 2008,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/jeffrandaIU2 786970/When-the-going-gets-tough,-banks-yelp-
for-nanny.html.
126. For a description of major structural changes outlined by the U.S. Department of Treasury, see Press
Release, U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Remarks by Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr. on Blueprint for Regulatory
Reform (Mar. 31, 2008). This approach has been criticized by a leading New York investment banker as akin
to ""re-arranging the deckchairs on the Titanic." Interview with Investment Banker, New York (Apr. 21,
2008).
127. The strategic imperative governing contemporary regulatory design takes as a starting point the failure
of 'command and control' as an ordering mechanism. Despite multiple examples of failure, across a range of
regulatory settings, 'associational governance' remains proffered as a normative and practical improvement.
For original formulation, see WOLFGANG STREECK & PHILIPPE SCiumIl-rFER, Community, Market, State-
and Associations, in PRIVATE INTEREST GOVERNMENir: BEYOND MARKET AND STATE 1-29 (Sage Publica-
tion 1985); IAN AYRE & JOHN BRAITIIVAITE, REsPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING T-lE DEREGU-
LATION DEBATE (Oxford Univ. Press 1992); CHRISTINE PARKER, THE OPEN CORPORATION: EFFECTIVE
SELF RFGULATION AND DiRVIocRAcY (Cambridge Univ. Press 2002); see generally, Power, supra note 121, at
36-42.
128. For application to US financial market regulation, see Charting an Icarian Fligbtpatb, supra note 30.
129. See Kershaw, rupra note 123.
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as it may appear. A useful precedent can be found in the indirect ways in which private
equity was persuaded to enhance its accountability.
The transformative potential (and risk) of private equity occurs at a number of levels.
The involvement of existing management in private equity bids creates intractable con-
flicts of interest. The processes through which initial exit is managed raise difficult ques-
tions about the efficacy of existing rules governing control transactions. The narrow focus
on financial performance, alongside the shortened timeframes in which ownership is exer-
cised, may produce short-term gains but negatively impact on the longer-term sus-
tainability of the enterprise and its relationship with key internal and external
stakeholders. Paradoxically, the primary virtue associated with private equity, namely its
capacity to evade the public disclosure regime, ultimately became its Achilles Heel. It
made the industry particularly vulnerable to critiques based on transparency and accounta-
bility deficiencies.
While opacity is common to many alternative investment vehicles, private equity has a
very public face. Moreover, the extent to which iconic (and profitable) corporations were
being de-listed and restructured had an immediate market as well as socio-political im-
pact. In such circumstances, stonewalling by the industry was simply untenable. As the
industry-sponsored review into its operations in the United Kingdom acknowledged:
"The context for this enquiry is that a position that full disclosures and reporting to lim-
ited partners, the ultimate owners of private equity, are alone sufficient is no longer politi-
cally and otherwise sustainable, at least in respect of the largest portfolio companies." 130
According to the review, the only way to reduce contestation was to attend to the inter-
locking needs of legitimacy and authority. As Walker maintains:
the source of business legitimacy is economic success, and the means of maintaining
the undisturbed authority of business and business leaders is by clear and continuous
demonstration of that success. On this approach, the legitimacy of authority, impor-
tandy including that of the leaders of private equity, is likely to be easiest to defend in
a competitive market-where commercial success and the authority and rewards that
go with it are the direct result of demonstrable superiority in meeting consumer
needs.131
In order to achieve this legitimacy, the Walker Guidelines maintain that attention to in-
tegrity dimension is crucial.
What is meant by decency and integrity is more substantive than conformity with
contractual provision or the law: it relates to a set of principles and values that cannot
be encapsulated in a detailed set of rules. Standards of conduct are contagious, and
any degree of malpractice in a particular business situation can have a negative effect
on general expectations of what is and what is not normal business conduct and
weaken the legitimacy of corporate structures as a whole. 132
130. David Walker, Guidelines for Disclosure and Transparency in Private Equity 40 (Walter Working Group
2007), http://walkerworkinggroup.coin/sites/l 0051/files/wwg-report-final.pdf
131. Id. at 41.
132. Id.
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Walker goes further, however, by attending to the controversial question of whether im-
plicit contracts (determined by context) require attention:
[T]he effective mechanism of enforcement of such implicit contracts is not legal pro-
cess but the requirements of the parties to go on doing business together .... This
does not of course mean that implicit contracts are merely what all stakeholders
would like them to be .... But it does mean that reasonable expectations as to beha-
viour in matters such as appropriate communication, including its style and timeli-
ness, should not be disappointed. 133
A similar dynamic is now facing the SWFs. Indeed it is in the sector's interest to take a
much more active approach in overseeing portfolio corporations, if only to safeguard their
investment. Misguided reliance on the bureaucratic, legal, and political domains in devel-
oped markets has demonstrated that need all too clearly. The critical question is how to
generate the leverage to ensure that the codes of conduct gain widespread adoption. Here
the omens are not auspicious. Brazil, for example, is setting up its SWF with no input to
or from the discussions now taking place at the IMF in Washington. Moreover, despite a
communiqu6 from the OECD to accompany a ministerial meeting in June highlighting
support for the IMF discussions and the need for recipient countries to implement a code
of practice governing investment principles, there is no formal coordination between the
working groups in Washington and Paris. Such an approach is not only misguided, it is
likely to preordain conflict.
V. Conclusion
There are a number of sound policy, reasons to request greater disclosure from SWFs.
Firstly, greater disclosure could provide an early warning system of volatile build-ups of
capital within particular sectors. Secondly, greater oversight reduces the potential of sud-
den capital withdrawals causing or amplifying financial crises. Thirdly, it serves broader
public aims, including an increased hope for transparency in overarching domestic fiscal
policy. Fourthly, requiring SWFs to render explicit their investment strategies reduces
the perception that foreign policy objectives trump commercial ones. This judgment,
however, is a subjective one, which, if applied, could intensify rather than ameliorate ten-
sion. The critical but as yet unresolved policy question that remains, therefore, is how to
ensure compliance to a substantive code that has the potential to deliver meaningful trans-
parency and accountability. Success in this endeavor can only be vouchsafed if clarifica-
tion extends to foreign investment review processes that guarantee commitment to long-
standing principles governing equity of treatment. Notwithstanding tentative agreement
in Santiago, resolution of political contestation requires that adequate attention is placed
on this dimension of the equation. There is, however, an unacceptable degree of ambigu-
ity in the proposals emanating from Brussels, Washington, and Canberra. Each maintains
political discretion over ill-defined "strategic interests."
At a more fundamental level, the crisis in global markets requires an acceptance by
recipient countries that financial liberalization has generated players more adroit at play-
ing global markets. This is not to suggest that power has migrated fully; rather it is to
133. Id.
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argue that saving Wall Street requires cognizance of the limitations of pursuing a losing
geo-political and economic strategy. The forced expansion of financial liberalization in
the 1980s and 1990s through the conditionality criteria associated with the Washington
Consensus did much to undermine the authority of global institutions such as the IMF
and the OECD. How they respond to the issues raised by the transfer of capital from
south to north and east to west will determine not only their own legitimacy and authority
but also the capacity to engender stabilization.
The search for accountability is therefore a symbiotic process that requires careful se-
quencing. SWFs need to address deficiencies in their own governance. How the sector
responds will speak volumes about commitment to the principles of free trade or narrow
mercantile capitalism. As Daniel Cohen has perceptively observed, "the principal problem
with ... globalization is that it does not keep its promises.... It creates an image of new
closeness between nations that is only virtual, not real."' 34 If, however, proposals to regu-
late SWFs are used merely as a cover for a nascent protectionism, the cause of financial
liberalization will be set back. Much more problematically, the opportunity to ameliorate
what Joseph Schumpeter famously described as the "creative destruction" of capitalism
will have been squandered. In such a scenario, both lender and recipient will be egre-
giously impoverished.
134. DANIEL COHEN, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS ENEMIES 165-66 (MIT Press 2007).
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